Unofficial generated edition

# PostHog Company Handbook

Generated 2026-06-29. This is a readable snapshot; the live handbook remains canonical.

# 1. Why does PostHog exist? Our mission and strategy

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/why-does-posthog-exist

### Our mission

Equip every developer to build successful products.

### Why is that our mission?

Since the beginning, we've believed that engineers should be way more involved in making product decisions than they've been historically. In order to help them do that, we've built a collection of tools for engineers.

Similar tools to the ones we've built have existed for a long time, but they were always built with other users in mind. By building things like product analytics, session replays, feature flags and a data warehouse for engineers first, we give engineers the ability to make product decisions themselves. This massively increases the speed at which engineers can make good decisions.

The other way PostHog helps engineers is by combining _all_ the tools they need into one product. This avoids a ton of work integrating and linking up various products, both when integrating and ongoingly.

We try to help engineers from the very beginning, when their product is just being built. We do that by having generous free tiers, and no need to talk to sales to get started.

### Our strategy

#### 1. Be the source of truth for all product context

Building a successful product is hard; doing so when you don't understand your customers is even harder. It's wild that no one has already provided a complete record of everything engineers need to ship products. This has happened because the entire industry has focused on integration instead of consolidation.

Traditionally, as companies scale, their data warehouse becomes the source of truth, and non-warehouse native tools (like product analytics) become less relevant as engineers lose trust in the data they collect, simply because they are misused and divorced from the source of truth. Every company winds up with a huge mess of data spaghetti, with their business logic still spread across dozens or hundreds of tools.

We provide developer infrastructure - by providing _every_ tool engineers need in one place, we can:

- Enhance the utility of all the tools when used together by engineering teams
- Increase trust in data by eliminating complex data stacks that engineers have to navigate
- Automate everything better than anyone else can, by using AI across this wider context
- Continue to provide all the tools engineering teams need as they grow

#### 2. Provide every tool engineers need to build successful products

We aim to offer every tool engineering teams need to debug, understand, and improve their products. From session replay for debugging to feature flags for safe deployments, we help engineers ship better code faster.

We can then get our AI to work across all of them together, whilst making every individual tool cheaper than the rest of the market - since we provide so many we can charge less. This means engineers get better tools at a fraction of the cost of piecing together solutions from multiple vendors.

#### 3. Get in first

Since developers exist first in a startup, by getting in with them early, we are naturally upstream of every other tool they might have considered using. Although anyone can pick up our products (and lots of mature companies certainly do), this means we can best deliver developer infrastructure to early stage companies, and so should focus there by default.

_Once_ we land a customer, we then let them pull _us_ upmarket as they grow. But not before. We don't want to hire a big enterprise sales team and go upmarket before our existing customers are there. This keeps us efficient and able to stay focused on building tools that engineers actually want to use.

#### 4. Automate the iteration process

Because we have all the context on both users and the product, we can automate large chunks of the cycle of shipping -> observing -> iterating.

### Secret master plan

- Ship every tool and all the data that engineering teams need to understand their product and users
- Use that to speed up the cycle of shipping -> observing -> iterating
- Eventually, automate the entire cycle

# 2. How we got here

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/story

### Things that influenced us

#### Books

- No Rules Rules (Erin Meyer / Reed Hastings)
- Principles (Ray Dalio)

#### Other companies

- Atlassian – multi product, inbound, dev centric company, totally dominant in their categories, scaled way beyond $1bn
- AWS – multi product, pricing model, UX (!)
- Pager Duty – pricing model, product led growth
- Hubspot – built a $25bn company despite competing with Salesforce
- GitLab – while we run _very_ differently and have a different business model, we were inspired by their transparency
- Sentry – branding and bottom-up approach
- Algolia – developers doing marketing
- GitHub – enterprise go-to-market is 200 developers forcing their company to buy us

### Handbook

Like many things at PostHog, this handbook has scrappy origins.

Tim and James were planning on launching on Hacker News, and wanted to look as mature as possible. We felt that few people would want to use a flaky new startup's product seriously. So we asked ourselves: how do we signal that we're mature?

We looked around at some big, boring companies and realized they all had huge footer sections on their websites with lots of links! How do we produce a lot of content to add to our footer when the product, at that time, was so simple? The answer: we should write up how we want to work.

Once we started writing the handbook, we realized it would transform our company. Every team member, and even strangers on the internet, could suggest changes. If you're doing something in public, you're going to think it through better. Ultimately, it made us treat the company as our product.

It's a classic example of getting information by doing, rather than by planning too carefully.

### Timeline

#### January 2020: The start

PostHog was founded by James and Tim on January 23, 2020.

We started working together on a startup in August 2019. Our first idea was to help engineers manage technical debt. It didn't work out, but we realized the power of treating growth as an engineering problem. We also knew that many engineers struggle to understand the impact they have on the people who use what they build.

There are plenty of product analytics tools out there, but all the alternatives are SaaS-based. While they're powerful, they can be frustrating for developers. From our perspective, these tools can be problematic because:

- We don't want to send all our user data to third parties
- We want full underlying data access
- They don't give you choice and control over pricing

#### February 2020: Launch

We got into Y Combinator's W20 batch, and, just a couple of weeks after starting, realized that we needed to build PostHog.

We launched on Hacker News with our MVP, just four weeks after we started writing code. PostHog was our sixth idea – we had been pivoting almost once a month for half a year. Boy were we relieved!

The response was overwhelmingly positive. We had over 300 deployments in a couple of days. Two weeks later, we'd gone past 1,500 stars on GitHub.

Since then, we've realized we weren't just onto a cool side project, we were onto what could be a huge company. It turned out there were a lot of developers who liked us who wanted a better choice, built for them.

#### April 2020: $3m seed round

After we finished Y Combinator, we raised a $3.025m seed round. This was from Y Combinator's Continuity Fund, 1984 Ventures.

As we started raising, we started hiring. We brought on board Marius, Eric and James G.

#### May 2020: First 1,000 users

We kept shipping, people kept coming!

#### October 2020: Billions of events supported

This was a major update – PostHog started providing ClickHouse support. Whilst we launched based on PostgreSQL, as it was the easiest option to ship quickly, this enabled us to scale to billions of events.

#### November 2020: Building a platform

We realized that our users, whether startups, scale ups or enterprises, have simple needs across a broad range of use cases in understanding user behavior.

PostHog now supported product analytics, feature flags, and session replays.

#### December 2020: $9m Series A

We kept growing organically and took the opportunity to raise a $9M Series A, topping our funding up to $12M led by GV (formerly Google Ventures).

Our focus remained firmly product, engineering and design oriented, so we increased our team in those areas.

We now had employees in ten countries, and it still felt like day one.

Everyone takes a mandatory two weeks off over Christmas to relax.

#### June 2021: $15m Series B

We raised a $15m Series B a little ahead of schedule, led by existing investor Y Combinator.

We're now focused on achieving strong product-market fit with our target segment in 2021.

Our team had grown to 25 people in 10 countries.

#### September 2021: Product-market fit achieved for PostHog Scale

We achieved product-market fit for our open-source product and PostHog Scale.

Our revenue quickly rose as a result. Now we needed to optimize it.

We were 30 people in 12 countries.

#### January 2022: Sales comes from our team, not our founders

We hired two Customer Success experts dealing with all inbound requests. We hired two more engineers, since most questions customers have are technical.

#### December 2022: 6x revenue growth

We had a fantastic year. While the tech market crashed, we grew 6x and reached millions in revenue, with a sub-two-month CAC payback period. We set $10m ARR as our next goal, with a gross margin of 70% – both of which should mean we've got all the metrics needed for the next fundraise.

We optimized revenue growth by implementing a product-led CRM for our customer success team, adding to our content team size, and creating a two-person growth engineering team. These teams all make a big difference!

We deepened all of our product areas significantly – we frequently win deals as a standalone session recording, feature flagging or experimentation tool. Session recording usage started to match product analytics usage.

Our infrastructure is far more stable and scalable – much more of it runs as code. We can now offer EU- or US-based hosting for our customers' data.

We're now 38 people in lots of countries. We're not adding lots of headcount over the next 12 months, though. We're staying lean and letting revenue continue to rise rapidly.

#### February 2023: Focus on mass adoption

We're doing well at monetizing high-growth startups due to our optimization work, averaging over 15% MoM for the last six months.

We've decided to double down on mass adoption of the platform in high potential startups instead of focusing on enterprise. Simply, this will better help us increase the number of successful products in the world. As a result, we've removed support for paid self-hosted deployment and are doubling down on our open source and cloud projects. We have released a free tier of PostHog.

We went from "product analytics with some extra stuff thrown in" to "Product OS" and started charging for session replay separately.

In the product, we're working on making the experience slicker, and we have plans for a standalone quality CDP in Q2.

#### March 2023: Decided to ship a warehouse

For a long time, we were happy competing with lots of $1-2 billion companies, each providing point solutions. We felt our market was just the sum of all of theirs.

But we kept seeing companies streaming their PostHog data to a warehouse - such as BigQuery. We even lost our then-largest customer for this reason - where their source of truth became their warehouse instead of PostHog.

So we decided we would ship our own warehouse, enabling us to remain the source of truth for customer and product data. This would let us offer a better integrated service to our customers, and meant we could work on a bigger challenge.

#### August 2023: Growth continues

We've doubled revenue so far this year without any increase in headcount. We've hit 15.7% MoM for the last 12 months. Our CAC payback is now just five days. Our numbers are exceptional. We even discounted several of our products. We've added ten extra roles and will be profitable in around a year.

We have user surveys and the data warehouse in private beta. Other products are being positioned as first-class products of their own (AKA "The Great Unbundling"). This means we can make it clearer for new folk to get what we do, give more ownership (which means more speed) to our own teams, and we can compete on commercials more effectively.

Our infrastructure has become pleasingly stable. The biggest challenge is scaling our data pipeline, and making sure we give as much responsibility as we can to each small team owning each product for their own pipelines, where rational to do so.

#### October 2023: Winning the internet

We are often mentioned as an alternative to product analytics tools.

We are winning the internet when we get more of this for our _other_ products. We don’t have to win everything, but we need to get into the comparison each time. This is _starting_ to happen, but to win the Internet, we need to see this happening daily.

Multiple products are early like the warehouse, ETL, surveys (used a lot but not paid), feature flags and experimentation (first revenue), CDP (pipelines being rebuilt, webhooks next), notebooks, and web analytics.

There is a lot of supporting work needing to be done. This includes:

- Helping teams with their per-product onboarding and growth experiments, infra, ingestion, dev tooling, sales, support, and marketing.
- Promoting each product in its own right (i.e. through what we cover in marketing).
- Keep nurturing the content / community growth, i.e. newsletter, and the `/posts` concept.

#### January 2024: Well, that was good

That was quite the year.

We wound up quadrupling our revenue, but only increasing our net headcount by three people in 2023. Last year, we validated that we could get multiple products to product-market fit (like feature flags and experimentation).

We built more integrations between our products like HogQL, notebooks, CDP, and the data warehouse.

Now, we are doubling down. We shipped a lot in Q4 2023, but every product could be improved a lot. We're caring about the craft of our products:

- Major missing features vs competitors
- Scalability/stability
- Developer UX
- Talking to users and incorporating their feedback
- Nailing support for your product - fixing things

Products are not limited to engineers working on the app. It includes what customer success, marketing, and ops are working on. Everything can be considered a product.

Each team should be aiming to feel proud of what they've built by the end of the quarter.

#### April 2024: We're now the default for startups

54% of the first Y Combinator batch this year adopted PostHog.

Tim and James turned up to talk at batch events and we were surprised at the number of groupies wearing PostHog merch – our merch is really cool now, we've gone way beyond the logo-on-a-black-t-shirt standard.

As far as we can tell, we're in the top three products used by YC companies.

#### July 2024: Price cuts ftw

We cut pricing by up to 80% for our two most popular products, including for our existing customer base. This was popular with users and led to faster growth.

We've started doing growth reviews for almost every product we have. We run through each product's metrics (revenue/usage/support/performance) and feedback / reasons for any churn that has happened, so we can truly treat each small team like a startup. This session is designed so the engineering team leads may choose to reprioritize work, or not.

#### October 2024: 100,000 customers, and speeding up – more products and more people

We hit 100,000 customers either paying or free, and over a quarter of a million users. We've started hiring a lot faster as growth has continued this year. We're now 65 ish people with ~9 products.

We've added some people in sales, but it is strictly (i) sales assist, talking to people that have asked to speak to us, and (ii) cross sell to existing customers.

We're inbound-led, and most customers buy from us without ever talking to sales, so we can remain efficient and either hire more engineers or cut our pricing for our customers so more of them recommend us!

We've hired a sales engineer super early (Mine, she's awesome) and we're really working on the culture in this team proactively.

Strategy-wise, we're just leaning into our basic three principles, which we're seeing more and more evidence are working well:

1. All the tools in one – We want to go wider still. We think we can provide _every_ piece of SaaS that startups use, starting with those closest to customer data. We want to expand to a customer support product, the marketing and sales stack of tools too.

1. Get in first – Don't go upmarket. We're closing enterprises regularly, but we're not trying that hard here. We're trying to stay away from complex migrations for users who use many products already.

1. Be the source of truth – Our own data warehouse is now available and very popular.

Revenue is in the low $10s of millions of ARR. We're very strongly default alive and will struggle to not end up profitable next year. Every time we get close to being profitable, we start speeding up hiring.

Revenue growth is fast enough and we're getting so many unprompted offers for investment (that we aren't taking) that money isn't really a meaningful constraint anymore. Whilst we have a great grip on each product's individual performance, our understanding of cross sell is a little weak, so we're working on that now.

Our marketing is getting weirder. It's more and more fun. We've commissioned a puppet, coming in January. Watch this space. Our newsletter, Product for Engineers, now has 20,000 subscribers and it's growing fast.

We're realizing that the more ambitious we are, the easier it gets – customers get excited, investors get excited, employees get excited. We can now see a real path to being a $100bn+ company and changing how software teams work industry-wide.

# 3. How we get users

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/how-we-get-users

Over 100,000 users have signed up to PostHog.

Most companies build their product with a particular user in mind. We build _everything_ around our ideal customer profile.

So when it comes to marketing and sales, we are optimizing for developer experience.

### Why we're like this

We've met a lot of successful founders in our space who are full of regret, despite leading companies with well over $100m in annual revenue! The one regret they _all_ had in common was letting go of their growth engine (people recommending their product to each other) and getting focused on sales. They all wound up exiting. That's why they told us this stuff.

The way this pans out? As they got bigger, they gradually shifted from building for users toward building for buyers, hoping to optimize for revenue growth. Over time, that killed their word-of-mouth growth, which caused them to have to work harder for each sale. So they got more salesy, and so on. They became companies that focused on making a bunch of money _by_ building a product, instead of being companies focused on building a great product.

We won't make this mistake.

### For us, marketing is creating useful content

Our is small. Way, _way_ smaller than our competitors'. Winning on volume of content is out of the question. So we'd better win on quality.

This constraint has worked out pretty well for us. Distribution is pretty easy when the thing you're working on is good enough to generate word-of-mouth growth – and this helps build an enduring developer brand.

We even hire full-stack developers into our marketing team to make sure we can cover the full depth needed in a lot of our tutorials, docs, and posts.

Things you won't find our marketing team doing: removing information from our website to increase conversion, focusing on paid ads, or letting colleagues ship content they aren't proud of.

### We happily spend lots of money on our website

Most companies call it their "marketing website". You already know it's going to be crappy.

We treat our website as a product. With real investment. When we were just a couple of people, we realized that our website _is_ our sales team – since our users would want to self-serve as much as possible.

When we started out, we also realized that all our competitors had crappy marketing websites.

And, as with so much that we do, we get an _increasing return_ on quality. If we do things noticeably better than everyone else, then we're remarkable. That results in word-of-mouth growth.

### We make it extremely easy for you to buy PostHog

Most sales teams do a bunch of low-quality cold outbound that harm their company's reputation and 99.999% of the time is ignored. And then once they've got you on a call, they pepper you with MEDDPICC questions before actually letting you see the product. Who knows, maybe 3 meetings later they'll share some pricing too!

We do things a little bit differently. Customers _buy_ from us, we don't _sell_ to them. It means we can instead invest our money in shipping more (and better) products, at lower prices than our competitors, to provide a sustainable advantage.

Fun fact: the total spend we have on marketing and sales per customer we acquire pays itself off within 3 months of them signing up for a paid plan. "Best in class" is considered to be one year...!

# 4. Who we build for

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/who-we-build-for

We define who we build for as ICP, i.e. the team, and the persona, i.e. the actual people using PostHog.

### Our current ICP

AKA our ideal customer profile.

We build for the people building products in AI-pilled software teams at any scale.

We want to be the first tool that technical founders go to when they start building their product.

| &nbsp; | AI-pilled software teams | | --- | --- | | Description | Ambitious (ie they want to grow a lot) software teams that either just getting started or already have product-market fit and are quickly scaling up with new customers, hiring, and adding more revenue. They believe in an AI-first approach to building and are already familiar with the standard AI tools. | | Criteria | - They have 1 to 500 potential PostHog users, but the company itself could be anything from one employee to thousands<br />- Has lots of revenue or aims to raise or has raised from leading investors<br />- Not hobbyists or cost-conscious bootstrappers, basically| | Why they matter? | - We believe AI-pilled companies will outperform non-AI-pilled companies <br />- We're able to efficiently monetize them<br />- Very quick sales cycle<br />- They act as key opinion leaders for earlier-stage startups and slower-moving companies<br />- They have strong opinions on what they need, which helps us build a better product | | Examples | PostHog any time from during YC to IPO, Supabase, ElevenLabs |

### Our current Persona

Persona is the job title or role of the person actually using a product in PostHog.

PostHog's initial adoption inside an ICP should come from an _engineering_ persona most of the time, simply because engineers exist first in startups. This persona can include technical founders. The more we appeal to engineers at the earliest stages of their startup's life, the more overall growth we will have.

> We should in general go _very_ hard on making sure we have excellent coverage of any needs an engineer has in trying to build a product first.

Once we're in with engineering, we spread to multiple personas. AI tools have led to the emergence of non-engineer builders inside software teams. These are product, support, or marketing people who have realized they _can_ now code. They are unlikely to ever be as technical as an engineer, but the tools and problems they can tackle now overlap. Some light touch work can dramatically improve PostHog's usefulness for these other teams and we should be willing to do that when its obvious. For example, PostHog AI is used by 25% engineers, 25% founders (often technical), and 50% across other roles. An anti-goal is to completely ignore the 50% of other roles.

The anti persona: we are unlikely to build products for people furthest from product, such as those in finance, ops, or recruitment. There simply is much less need for customer data in those teams, we don't have any natural advantage here.

# 5. How we make users happy

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/making-users-happy

User happiness is fundamentally important. How do we achieve this?

### Building products that people want

First, someone internally will suggest an idea. Sometimes this will come from James and Tim, but it has, just as frequently, come from anyone else on the team.

If it requires a new team to build it – which it usually will – we'll start by hiring an ex-founder who is technical. We'll onboard them into the existing team that has the most overlap. This helps get them used to working with our codebase, as well as with the culture we look for from each team.

That person builds the MVP, and the only goal is to figure out if anyone will use it. With some products, the MVP may have more scope if we feel especially confident. Once the new product is in a non-embarrassing state (that won't harm our brand), we add pricing to it and put it on our website. This drives more demand. At this stage, the goal is to get the product to product-market fit in PostHog's platform, which means working with customers until we have five delighted, paying customers.

Once all this is done – which we'd expect to take a few months – we can start to innovate. This usually means some kind of platform play, such as extending the product to enhance everything else we're working on, or shipping another new product that would work well with it.

### Engineers talk to users and provide support

You should be _as close as possible_ to your users, feeling whatever they feel, so you have as much information as possible to make the product great.

For established products with a lot of usage questions (how do I create an insight that does X, for example), Customer Success helps with support.

Before a new product is even made, we'll add it to our public roadmap. Once it ships, we'll use our own tools to get customer interviews, feedback, and data, and we'll always aim to "close the loop" with users - coming back with: a pull request, a GitHub issue they can follow in the open, or an explanation of why we can't make a feature they've asked for.

This means the product improves, users are impressed and recommend us to others, _and_ we show users that we listen, encouraging them to keep going through this loop with us, faster and faster.

# 6. How we make money

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/how-we-make-money

We make money from those that have it and like our products. We don't make money from those that don't.

### How we do sales is based on the best experience for our Ideal Customer Profile

I cannot think of any harder group than developers to convince, via a cold-call or email, to buy software. We should focus on inbound.

All the other rules here are based on what we felt would be the best experience for an engineering customer, whilst allowing us to grow revenue in the long run.

### Don't let pricing get in the way

Before a user has decided to buy the product, we should let them try it for free. Not only does this mean they can immediately self-serve without having to get budget internally, it also reduces the need for a large sales team to convince them otherwise. When someone is looking for a solution, they are ready to install it – but only if we can get out of the way commercially.

Once a user likes the product, we don't want to create a big decision around continuing to expand their usage with us. (For example, if we suddenly charged a large recurring price per month.) Instead, we charge a tiny fraction of a cent for each extra event they send.

### Charge based on what people use, and give users control

Some users want to start with just a little usage of one product. Others replace five products with us. We should price to reflect this. We believe it's better to have a little extra pricing complexity to provide a much better value option, than an "all-in-one" price.

We charge by product _and_ by usage of those products that people need.

Beyond which products we use, we look for other ways to give users control, such as spending limits on session recordings.

These principles mean that they will spend less than they otherwise would have, _but_ it means they'll stick around. We don't want users to churn if they are unhappy with what they're spending; we want them to better manage how they use the platform.

### Match the cheapest for each individual product

We can make it up by selling other products to the customer over time. This way, it's always a no-brainer to pick PostHog, we get as much word-of-mouth growth as possible, _and_ our single product competitors can't compete since they have nowhere to go.

### Principles for dealing with big customers

The most important thing here is to remain focused on building the best product, not on what a single big customer needs.

- We don’t care about losing deals. If we have to walk away from a deal because we'd have to compromise on these principles, we will. We can do this because we have a really strong growth engine with our ICP customers.

- We don't contract deliverables, and we especially don't contract to provide deliverables by a certain date. This is because, on principle, a single customer is forcing us to build something.

- We will build things for a big customer, as long as we are confident they won’t be the only user of that thing. Re-shuffling the roadmap a bit could make sense - but adding new things that others wouldn't use, doesn't.

- Customers need to try PostHog before they expect us to change things. We love feedback from customers. We don't love big requirement documents from people that haven't used our product before.

# 7. Enduringly low prices

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/low-prices

We want our customers to spend their money on their engineering team, not on buying ten software products.

Here is the list of advantages we have and why they matter.

### We can sell multiple products to the same people

So, do you want to buy ten products for $1k each or all ten for $5k? Or, better yet, each one separately?

We can pull this off because we're focused on getting in first – we don't follow the whims of whatever an enterprise may have.

### No sales needed

Our competitors spend more on sales and marketing than product development. Nearly all our sales are self-serve _and_ 70% of our customers find us through word-of-mouth growth.

### Multiple products, one dataset

We aim to be the source of truth for customer and product data. The products we build all work from this same dataset, instead of ten different vendors all paying to store the same data as each other – each with their own platform teams.

### A technical audience who need _docs_, not technical support

Many of our products are traditionally sold to non-technical people. They need more help setting up SDKs or snippets. We work with engineers who simply need good docs. Writing and maintaining those (and an open-source codebase that people can inspect or even fix bugs in themselves) saves thousands of support questions each year.

### Using open-source technology

We've often had second-mover advantages.

One of these is that we could use the latest open-source technologies, like ClickHouse. Many of our competitors have had to build their own databases. You can guess which is more efficient for storing tens of billions of events and serving millions of analytics queries. Better them than us!

# 8. Deciding which products we build

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/which-products

Providing all the tools in one is a core part of our strategy.

Shipping them in the right order is key to a fast return on investment from every new product.

### How we pick new products

Until products are built and launched, it's hard to predict which ones will do well. Because of this, we want to be working on a mix of new products at any given time. Some we're very sure will do well, others might be more of a bet with a potentially big outcome. This guidance is therefore less prescriptive that it could otherwise be.

Products we know will work well if we ship them:

- Products engineers use at all company stages
- Think error tracking or feature flags. The persona doesn't change as the company gets bigger.
- Especially true if it works for a 2 person startup, because that means we get in first
- Products that are in extremely fast growing markets
- Think AI Observability, MCP
- Products that are very easy to integrate for our existing customers.
- For example, users can enable the product in PostHog without needing to make a code change, or products that built on top of data that people are already collecting in PostHog
- Products that _you_ are excited to build.
- People pursuing their interests get more done, go much further, and execute to a better standard.
- Products that our customers are asking for

Products we're less excited about building:

- Products where the ICP quickly changes to someone outside the product team, especially teams far removed from engineering
- For example, a CRM. We'd be more excited about building a customer support tool, as support often is a task that involves engineering.
- Products that lean into 2020 style products, not 2030 style products
- Think lots of UX for humans to use

### How new products get built

Sometimes the Blitzscale team will decide a new product needs to be built. They'll find someone internally to run it, ideally someone who's been at PostHog for at least 6 months (we tried getting new people to ship new products, but they often struggled to ship quickly).

Other times you might have an idea for a great product we should build. In that case, use the New Product RFC template. You might choose to hack together a prototype of the product to demo and show off, which you should do! Blitzscale only needs to get involved if you want to start working on this product full time. At that point, we are choosing whether to invest a pretty serious amount of money into launching it, so we want to get that right.

The best products are often ones that not everyone thinks is a good idea before launch. For example, Tim was against building Session Replay, and it's one of our most popular products. To make sure we take big bets, _any_ Blitzscale team member can OK a new product being built, even if other Blitzscale members disagree. That Blitzscale person will be the one who the new team reports to. This way we avoid consensus stopping us from making big bets.

For a complete walkthrough of the product lifecycle, see releasing new products and features.

### Next products on deck

From our roadmap, here's what we're currently working on:

- Endpoints - `#team-data-modeling`
- Logs - `#project-logs`
- Product autonomy - `#team-array`
- Customer Analytics `#team-web-analytics`
- Workflows `#team-workflows`

And these are the products we think we'll focus on next:

- 100x the toolbar - likely `#team-array`
- Metrics
- APM
- BI over any database (not just those synced to our data warehouse)
- Support -> PRs
- AI answers and docs

### How to pick which feature within an existing product to build

In the early days, you'll be shipping the main few features that your category of product has as standard. In product analytics, this would be something like (1) capturing events, (2) trends, (3) funnels, (4) retention, and (5) person views.

Once this is done, you'll get a stream of feature requests and bug reports from users. You can't go too wrong if you listen to these and, by default, prioritize those that help us get in first, first. For example, with our data warehouse, we picked multi-tenant architecture because we wanted startups to be able to get started for free or very little initial cost - even though a single tenant approach would have given us an MVP faster. Sometimes, if sales are asking, you may choose to prioritize a feature for a big customer earlier, but you should never do this when you wouldn't have shipped it at some stage anyway. However, be cognizant of how often you do this, and whether now is the right time to be shifting your persona focus.

Later on, you can then _innovate_ several ways:

- unpeel your product - you start with the software, then offer API access, then offer better API access, then infrastructure (if you are feeling brave) - by default, start with this reminder: charge for API access appropriately, speak to Annika for help figuring this out. Doing this increases our luck surface area (it means your users will find new use cases).
- features more specific to our ICP (make it more engineering-y, more customization, more power)
- integrate it with our other products (either feature them _in_ the product you just built, or feature your product in _theirs_)

# 9. We're a wide company with small teams

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/wide-company

Part of our strategy is to provide all the tools in one for evaluating feature success.

### Speed

This means we need to ship a _lot_ of products into one platform. We can see a need for at least 20. That's a lot of engineering work.

After we'd started hiring, we asked ourselves a question – how could we structure the company to optimize for speed above everything else?

I happened to go to an excellent talk by Jeff Lawson, the CEO of Twilio. It made me realize I should be asking, "Who ships more per person, a startup or an enterprise?" Clearly the former. So we structured PostHog like a series of startups.

### Small teams

We decided that we should split PostHog into a series of small teams, each working like its own startup, fully owning at least one of our products.

As with any startup, the principles that govern these small teams are:

- Can decide what to build within their own products
- Can ship without outside interference as far as possible
- No product management by default
- No product design by default
- Should work directly with its own users (until it has hit product-market fit within PostHog's platform)
- Should be small

### Minimal hierarchy

We deliberately keep the number of levels and people managers at PostHog to the absolute minimum we can get away with. This maximizes team member autononomy _and_ increases shipping speed, as you don't need to run things past a manager or wait to get something signed off the vast majority of the time.

This means that, if you need something or need to flag an issue, you are strongly encouraged to communicate _directly_ with the person or team working on the thing you care about. We want to avoid people going up and down the org chart via managers as much as possible. 90% of the time, this approach means you'll get what you need faster. 10% of the time, this might cause a tiny bit of confusion if what you are asking for doesn't beautifully align with that team's objectives. We believe that trade-off is ok - we'll figure it out.

We have a tiny exec team - this is what they are responsible for:

- Set the overall direction and strategy for PostHog
- Decide which products to build
- Make key people decisions (e.g. who to hire, pay, disciplinary issues)
- Ensure complicated cross-team initiatives run smoothly (e.g. pricing)

For _everything else_, you and/or your small team should be able to decide this or talk directly to the teams involved. This includes deciding which feature to build next within a particular product. We trust you to bring in the right people as you feel appropriate, relative to the scale of what you're doing.

PostHog is _not_ a good place for managers who are territorial and prefer for all communication to go through them for 'efficiency'. Over time, doing this would undermine autonomy and cause our best people to quit!

### Titles based on what you do

Companies give out titles to people that primarily show how senior they are.

This means titles, as adopted by the wider world, imply that _seniority_ is more important than what people do. We do not believe that seniority should determine how decisions get made - people should own decisions in their area of the business. We trust every employee to fully own their area of the business.

When you are prompted to put your title somewhere like LinkedIn, please just say as clearly as you can what you are focused on. Please do not focus on how senior you are. Feel free to be weird with it.

In other words, instead of your title being "Senior Engineer at PostHog" (which is not a title that exists at PostHog anyway), it's actually "Product Analytics Engineer at PostHog."

### Goal setting

When you build a startup from scratch, you are in an existential crisis. One day you might be building a gym, the next day a software product for accountants. The problem changes. At PostHog, we give each small team a product to build. (James and Tim focus on _which_ products we should build, as they often need sequencing.)

Once we had product-market fit, and we had reached 15 people or so, we realized we needed to set some kind of goals. We started by using OKRs as they're pretty standard.

However, one of our engineers one day told me, "I realized I needed to change my objective. Then I started rewriting my OKRs into the handbook. I realized I was spending time stressing about the wording of it, which was going to have zero impact on what I knew I had to build." That seemed silly, so instead we make a point of calling them just "goals". We intentionally don't sweat the wording.

Another best practice we choose to ignore is "goals should be output driven". It sounds great in principle, but what is going to happen after a product team, which is nearly every team here, sets an output driven goal like "improve activation by 20%"?

Either the team will decide on some things it should build, or they won't manage to figure out what to build to do this. In either case, if a team knows what it should achieve, it should then figure out which things it needs to ship, and write those things down instead. It's clearer, and clearer is faster.

And if that list turns out not to be helping our metrics? Switch the goal to a new thing.

# 10. Strong team

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/strong-team

_You're the driver_ is one of our values. 90% of a startup's problems are solved by just having the right group of people in ~~the building~~ Slack.

### Personality traits that cause people to be successful here

Genuine builders. Some people do jobs for the money. Those that have truly found their passion are _far_ stronger.

Easy to work with. People who are low ego, flexible, energetic, and upbeat will raise those around them. We often, but don't exclusively, hire those with more experience since it's easier for them to contribute meaningfully. Things can and do get _very_ hard here – whether it's scaling, shipping complex products, handling a stream of support requests, or trying to ship something that touches multiple teams. We need those who won't get disheartened, and will collaborate, iterate, and ship their way out of anything. We proactively reward those that do these things, not those that self-promote.

Will join us on the journey. Some people are inspirational to work with – they lift others up. We have a _huge_ opportunity at PostHog, and it often feels like we've caught lightning in a bottle. Anyone joining the company at this stage could make this the last job we all ever need. We want people that will push to get this done, for each other's sake. We don't hire mercenaries. We need to feel people here are producing the best work of their lives.

Drivers not passengers. Proactive people that can fully own projects and get them done (or make sure they get help) are what we need. For many of our roles, while it isn't a common job title, internally we have the concept of product engineers – people who can take high-level requirements, decide what to build, do so with customers, and keep iterating.

### Great (and terrible) reasons to join us

Let's start with why you _should_ join:

- You want to ship an epic product with incredible people.
- You want impact and autonomy, and work well with uncertainty.

Why you _should not_ join:

- Getting our brand on your resumé. If you join for self-promotion, you (ironically) won't do well! Apply to a bigger company who can give you a clearer career ladder.

- Getting a pay rise. We pay generously, but you'll need to _love_ building to be happy here. You'll need to be here a long time to get the real upside from options.

- Mainly wanting to lead others. Reluctant managers are often the best. We don't pay more if you manage others. We want people to lead by example by doing an exceptional job of individual work.

### A small group of stronger people and compensation

When we raised our Series A, one of the first things we did was to make sure we didn't lose our existing team (at least for pay reasons!) _before_ we added more people to it. This is still true today – we proactively review everyone's pay three to four times a year and increase it if people have leveled up.

When it comes to churn due to pay, fairness is just as important as the absolute level. We do this in line with a transparent pay system that we even make public. We aim to pay generously and fairly between people.

For options, we offer the most generous terms possible as it feels like the right thing to do. We think this makes it as likely as possible people can see huge upside if we are successful (making it easier to raise _and_ more realistic that people will actually get money from them). That motivates everybody.

One of the hardest parts about building a high performance team, is letting people go when they aren't performing. We are decisive and do this faster than many others would. We offer four months severance when we let people go for performance reasons to give people more time to move on – and so it's easier for us to make a change if we need to.

While we will give direct feedback, if we don't see this being responded to quickly ahead of letting someone go, we will part ways, so people can find a job they are better suited to, and so we can find a team member better suited to the job. The end result is that everyone on the team is contributing meaningfully.

### Growing the team beyond hiring

We hire insanely talented people to build products ourselves, but sometimes acquihires or acquisitions help us move faster by adding engineering capacity and expertise. These situations are rare so we’re often reactive with these - but we’ve set clear principles to make sure we handle them consistently.

#### Acquihiring

This is an efficient way to onboard great engineers without all the complexity of an acquisition. For us, an acquihire means closing down your old company as you and your team join PostHog purely as talent, which we will match up with our product teams where it makes sense.

- Everyone goes through our standard interview process. There are no exceptions, even if you join as a group. Coua Phang will organize each interview stage with your team members individually so everyone goes through the process in the same timeframe.
- We do not pay for acquihires - we just hire the people. Sometimes we’ll pay a premium if it makes hiring multiple people easier.
- For YC founders, we may sometimes pay a premium. This is treated like additional compensation that vests over the standard PostHog equity schedule (not a lump sum upfront).
- For engineers, we pay our normal salary with the possibility of a discretionary bonus after probation.
- If you quit PostHog to start your own company, we won't acquire or acquihire you back (though former employees-turned-founders are welcome to apply and join again under normal hiring processes).
- We never acquire companies bigger than one small team.

#### Acquiring products

##### IP inside PostHog

By default, we are not interested in acquiring IP. If we can build something ourselves, we will. The only exception is IP with deep technical value we don’t believe we can replicate internally.

If we want a product inside PostHog but lack the domain expertise, we might acquire the team behind it - with the expectation your team rebuilds the product natively into our platform and migrates users. This would be the case where, without domain knowledge, projects might take us an unreasonable amount of time to ship or get deprioritized. Even then, we will only do this if the price is right. We generally won’t pay a premium as the value comes from the team’s expertise, not the legacy product.

##### IP outside PostHog

We do not acquire products that sit completely outside our platform (e.g. an IDE). Our strategy changes often, and owning something disconnected would create pressure to keep it alive.

The exception would be if the product technically lives outside the platform but directly enhances PostHog’s value (e.g. a new way to use PostHog data inside a terminal), where we may consider an acquihire or paying a premium.

##### Existing customers

We generally do not want to convert any existing customers you have into PostHog customers directly. They may be different from our ICP and put pressure on the team to build something different than what we would otherwise plan to offer.

Your customers are of course welcome to sign up for PostHog and use our existing products and new ones once they are launched, but we don't make promises to these customers about features or support for their existing workflows.

#### Acquisitions for marketing

We are not interested in acquiring companies just for their audience or marketing. That’s a distraction, and we’re confident in the strength of our own marketing team. If we want more marketing, we’ll invest in it directly.

# 11. Values

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/values

These are the principles for the behavior we care about.

### You're the driver

We hire people that are really great at their jobs, and get out of their way. There are no deadlines, very minimal coordination and you won't have us breathing down your neck.

In return, we ask for extraordinarily high ownership. To succeed you need to be intrinsically motivated.

Great people at PostHog can take very high level direction, and ship quickly to find out as quickly as possible if our plans can survive contact with customers!

Being the driver means getting stuff done _yourself_. We've had non technical people create hardware products, coding in C++, we've got designers that will write Tailwind and React - rather than just create the file in Figma. Our salespeople answer technical questions without engineers as backup - and if they don't know the answer, they educate themselves more deeply for next time. We like people to go full stack instead to reduce the number of dependencies.

Building a company isn't a solo sport. We're Ted Lasso (although I've not watched to the end, I hope they win) not Wolf of Wall Street). We expect you to take high ownership of the _company_ and _your team_ being successful. This means when you see something wrong, you fix it or give direct feedback - it's not ok to watch your colleagues fail.

### Make it public

We default to transparency with everything we work on. That means we make a lot of things public: our code, our handbook, our roadmap, how we pay (or even let go of) people, what our strategy is, and who we have raised money from.

Internally, a culture of transparency looks like managers telling you to raise feedback directly with the person it concerns instead of solving problems for you, it means changing teams around in public Slack channels, it means detailed financial information, live updates on fundraising and board slide access.

Being transparent externally helps us achieve our mission - we write about what we're working on so the world can take advantage of the lessons we're learning, and so they know how to work with us better. Knowing that thousands of people will read our handbook pages forces clearer thinking. And, for free, we can build trust in a way other vendors just choose not to.

> There are a few things that we are internally transparent about, but that should not be shared publicly. Anything related to our company financials is strictly confidential and should not be shared externally, including our current revenue numbers, ACV, burn rate, etc. Anything in a public press release is fine to share!

### Do more weird

So much about how we work is different.

Weirdness can just be the absurd lengths we are willing to go to. It can mean redesigning an already world-class website, for the 5th time. It can mean shipping _literally_ every product that relates to customer data, with teams of just one to five people competing with $200bn+ companies, successfully.

We aren't weird for the sake of it. We want the company perfectly optimized for our strategy. We have small teams when very few others do, because we are going to build 50+ products. We post billboards of our founders' faces because no one else is brave enough thus it stands out. Even the little things - like having _pricing_ on our pricing page!

We've even written a guide on how you can do more weird.

### Why not now?

_Why not now?_ means getting things done _proactively_, _today_. You do not need consensus to do things – focus your energy on shipping what's most valuable for our customers and the company, then take ownership of making it happen, not on getting buy in from others. You certainly shouldn't wait until next quarter if your new idea makes more sense to work on than your previous goal.

We have learned the clearest lessons at PostHog by doing things, not from hypothesizing about them. If we're debating doing something, just trying it is the best way to learn. Doing more planning is rarely the right way to figure out if something will work, doing the thing is the answer by default here.

Sometimes this approach might mean you ship something that others don't agree with. You will need to be willing to throw away work sometimes, because the upside – not needing to get lots of approval to do stuff and being able to take more bets – means we all move so much faster that mistakes are a lot less costly.

_Why not now?_ doesn't just mean shipping huge product features. It may mean diving into a small customer support issue quickly to delight them – this is one of the main reasons people recommend us to others.

### Optimistic by default

We have a lot of control over our direction, and we've been very well served by shooting for the best case scenario every time we make a decision. You'll hear us say things like "play offense, not defense", "how do we 10x this", "how do we win in 10 years' time". Aiming for the best possible upside and sometimes missing is much better than never trying.

This is especially true when we think of new ideas - any big new thing can sound pretty silly at first, almost by definition. You'll hear PostHog war cries like "we haven't built our defining feature yet, maybe this". It never is, but that's _exactly_ the point. What we've already done is less important than what we do next. If we make new ideas painful to share with others, they'll eventually stop coming.

At a simple level, we want to be surrounded by people that are enthusiastic, passionate and happy. PostHog is a group of people working together with a shared goal. A positive, encouraging atmosphere simply means everyone is going to have a lot more fun and will be able to stick around for the full adventure here.

Put more grandiosely, PostHog is wildly ambitious, and with that, a level of optimism is _required_. You cannot change the world without first _believing_ you can change the world. People not believing is probably a bigger deal than people not being able to.

# 12. Building a world-class engineering environment

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/world-class-engineering

We know we've got to be quick to build all the tools in one. So we better have a world-class engineering environment that lets us build everything. How do we do that?

### No product management by default

Engineers decide what to build. If you need help, our product managers (we have four today) will give you coaching.

If an engineer at PostHog believes they should work on X, they can build X. We'd prefer you ship ten things quickly (and make a couple of mistakes) than plan too much. You will tend to gather more information by _doing_ rather than _planning_.

There are _some_ exceptions - for example, where we need to work on architecture, but we leave it down to you to decide when you should plan more or just get started.

### Transparency is fuel for autonomy

In nearly any company, having each engineer decide what to work on would fail. Why? They simply would lack enough context over what the company is aiming for, or what everyone else is up to.

PostHog is exceptionally transparent. You're reading our public handbook after all.

### It starts with hiring

Finally, we hire people we think will flourish in an autonomous environment. We often hire people with broader rather than narrower skill sets, who are more flexible. They've often started (and often failed) their own startups. They're low ego and flexible. They're builders at heart who love innovating and working like this.

One of the things we've learned is the very strongest engineers are usually those who want autonomy the most, and so freedom is a great way to attract and retain world-class talent. Now that we're lucky enough to have people like this already here, people see PostHog as a destination company, accelerating further our access to some of the best people in the world at what they do.

### A high percentage of our employees are engineers

If we want to ship a lot, we need to figure out how we can have most of capital go into engineering.

We have zero outbound sales, and a hyperefficient go-to-market, largely driven by self-serve. Since we focus on engineers, we have less customer support and set-up handholding than all our competitors.

80% of the company are shipping product.

### Deep work

When you're doing engineering, you're in the business of building up large, abstracted models in your head of how the code works. That takes time and requires focus. Doing a ton of meetings is a great way to screw this up.

We therefore have meeting-free days every Tuesday and Thursday. We encourage you to call it out if things are going into your calendar on these days. Since we also are all remote, these usually give you lengths of uninterrupted time to get your work done.

The only exceptions to this rule are for customer success and recruitment, who may need to have external meetings with users or candidates on these days in order to do their jobs.

# 13. Not running out of money

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/finance

### Stay calm and default alive

We don't optimize for short-run revenue growth, but we do make sure we have enough money to never feel dependent on future fundraising.

If we average 5% MoM growth, we are default alive (i.e. we'll become profitable before we run out of capital). If we average 7.5% we'll hit $100m by the end of 2026.

Maintaining a strong financial position helps us optimize for long-term revenue growth. For example, we've removed products and revenue for long-term gains.

### Fundraising principles

Rule #1: Never have to fundraise – and only fundraise if all the following are true:

- It will speed us up.
- We can use the money effectively.
- The partner would improve our board.
- The increased chance of success offsets dilution.
- It reduces stress.

### How do we spend it

PostHog grows by shipping, whereas most software companies grow linearly with the number of salespeople they hire.

The advantage of our approach is that it's more efficient – $1 spent on product will _forever_ improve things, unlike investing $1 in cold calls. We can easily choose to be profitable if we just sit default alive and let revenue grow "automatically" based on the product we have already shipped.

The disadvantage is that scaling an engineering team is, in our opinion, harder than scaling a sales team. Since engineers' work very heavily overlaps, there is more complexity to getting this right. We may not be able to grow beyond a certain rate, no matter how much we spend.

The final disadvantage is that it's harder to predict how fast we'll grow compared to a company that grows by hiring salespeople with targets, so it takes more thought and often requires more faith!

### The metrics we track and how to read our financials

The financial numbers we publish each month/quarter lives in the internal Finance Updates dashboard).

We group them into monthly financials (the basics — what we made, what we spent) and quarterly SaaS metrics (the efficiency lens to determine if we're growing well).

#### Financial reports

Revenue, COGS, gross profit — the money we made, the cost of delivering it, and what's left. Everyone has a stake, especially product and engineering — they influence both halves of this, what we charge for and what it costs to run. We want revenue and gross profit to grow; COGS grows too (more customers), but ideally, slower than revenue.

Gross margin — gross profit as a % of revenue, i.e. what we keep from each revenue dollar after the cost of delivering the product. The cleanest read on whether the product itself is profitable, before any other spend. Most relevant to engineering and FinOps, because COGS is mostly infra, hosting and costs of direct labour. Higher is better; a great SaaS business sits at 75%. Below that, we're pricing too low or our infra is too expensive.

Bad debt as a % of revenue — the share of billed revenue we never collect. Tells us about who we're selling to and how tight our billing and collections are. Most relevant to billing, finance, and sales. Lower is better — under 2% is our limit, under 1% is great.

Operating expenses (S&M, R&D, G&A) — the three big spend buckets: sales & marketing, R&D (mostly engineering), and general & admin. Where the money goes to run the business. Direction isn't as simple as "lower is better" — absolute dollars grow as we scale, and that's expected. What we want falling over time is OpEx as a % of revenue — that's operating leverage. R&D staying strong is a feature for a product-led company.

#### Quarterly SaaS metrics

ARR per employee — annual recurring revenue ÷ headcount. Tells us whether we're scaling efficiently or just adding people. Higher is better; IPO-stage SaaS sits around $580k.

Burn multiple — cash burned per $1 of new ARR. Tells us whether our growth is worth what it costs. Lower is better — under 1x is good, under 0.3x is top quartile.

SaaS magic number — new ARR earned per $1 of sales & marketing spend. A test of whether our go-to-market spend is paying off. Higher is better — above 1x means we're earning more in new ARR than we're spending to get it.

Rule of 40 — revenue growth % + profit margin %. Forces the trade-off question: are we growing fast at the expense of profit, or profitable at the expense of growth? Above 40% is the bar.

Cash balance — cash on hand at the end of the quarter. The most concrete measure of staying default alive. Everyone has a stake. Higher is better, obviously — but the goal isn't to not raise more; it's to not need to.

Cash runway (quarters) — how many quarters our cash lasts at our current burn. The cash balance question, framed against how fast we're spending. Relevant to everyone, especially anyone making hiring or major spend decisions. Longer is better. Default alive means we reach profitability before this hits zero.

Curious about our revenue metrics?

# 14. Future

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/future

TL;DR: Mid term, it's $100 million ARR by 2026, working backwards from there. Longer term, outcompete top-down competitors worth $50 billion. If we get that far, we'll have helped _tens of millions_ of engineers build better products.

### Will PostHog sell?

What motivates us is building an epic product and company.

We're excited by:

- Figuring out how far we can go
- Helping engineers build products - reduce the need for product and data teams
- Beating all the point solution competitors
- Having customers buy _from_ us instead of us selling _to_ them

We're not excited by:

- Selling the company for $1 billion – we think we can build a much bigger company by staying independent

### $100M by 2026

We want to hit $100 million in annual revenue by the end of 2026.

We've set this since it's ambitious and keeps us accountable for some kind of financial output, but working backwards we can do it. We need around 7% monthly revenue growth to hit this.

### Secondaries over selling

Everyone at PostHog has options in the company – that means they can be a shareholder. This keeps everyone focused on our long-term interests.

However, at different stages of the company's life, the value of each person's stock may be hundreds of thousands, millions, or even tens of millions of dollars. If someone doesn't have much capital but has $10 million in stock options, they'll start wanting us to sell.

As a result, we aim to let people sell some of their stock when we fundraise and once their stock has very significantly increased in value. This helps keep everyone focused on building something bigger and longer term. What we can offer will depend on what we can negotiate every time we fundraise, but this is our general philosophy.

# 15. How you can help

Source: https://posthog.com/handbook/help

People who work at PostHog have come from all sorts of different backgrounds – large companies, small companies, agencies, single-founder startups, and so on.

Their modes of working necessarily differ from each other and from PostHog, but we expect you to work in some fairly specific ways.

Being the transparent company that we are, we want to let you know about those expectations, because you can only meet expectations when you are aware of them!

Generally, our values are a great place to start, as is as the handbook page on culture, but here are a few specific ways to apply those values, and reinforce our culture as we grow:

### Getting yourself up and running quickly

If you're new, the default goal is to be able to get work done autonomously.

This will require:

- You know how to ship things in our environment and with your equipment
- You get to know your team and have a sense of who can review your work
- You get what the company, your customers, and your small team care about and needs to get done, so you can prioritize appropriately

Everything else is a means to this end! We often do onboarding in person to accelerate all the above. This usually takes around a week.

### Ask for help, but only after you've tried first

If you've just joined us, there's a lot you probably don't know. That's okay! However, we _do_ expect that you try to help yourself. Here's a framework to use as a guide:

- If it's one of our own products that we build and sell:
- We expect you to read our docs.
- We expect you to search through GitHub or Slack.
- If it's in beta, it might be buggy or missing features. Definitely request/report them, but also figure out how to do your job with plan B and plan C if it won't be fixed quickly - this is what we generally call grit.
- For engineers: try to figure something out by yourself for at least 1 hour, but don't remain totally stuck on something for more than 2 hours before asking for help. This time window should increase over time as you run into more questions that likely no one has the answer to, at which point it's time to dig in and figure it out.
- If it's an external product:
- We expect you to read the docs
- If it takes you more than 10 mins to figure it out, then ask someone internally.

You can also try self-serving an answer in our #ask-max Slack channel. It's trained on our handbook and documentation, so it's capable of answering both questions about internal processes and procedures, as well as product-related questions.

If you don't get the context you're looking for, try #ask-posthog-anything where team members are willing to point you in the right direction. Take a moment to explain how you've tried to help yourself and linking to resources. That saves others valuable time searching the docs again, or typing up a suggestion to do just that.

### Don't expect perfection

PostHog is a startup. As solid as our stack / product / CI / dev experience is for a company of our size (super solid, tbh), it might not be the extremely-well-oiled machine you had at BigCo. If something doesn't Just Work, follow the framework above to get help.

We're all human - you shouldn't expect perfection for adhering to our culture, either. But you should help others learn how to stick to our culture, especially new joiners. We're all prone to occasional lapses, and it takes everyone on the team nudging each other in the right direction to keep us all on track. If you notice something happening all the time, take it upon yourself to make it better - see the next section!.

### Make it better

If you run into something you found that is confusing or needs fixing, we expect you to update the docs or handbook at minimum, and if you're keen then definitely improve the experience yourself. For example, CI is _everyone's_ job. If it sucks, fix it.

That being said, there is often a _reason_ why things are the way they are. That reason might be "because no one wanted to fix it," but it also might be "because it broke yesterday and we're on it" or "we've carefully considered this before and decided to make it this way."

We encourage you to step on toes, but don't be a bull in a china shop. Context is oftentimes your best friend – gather it up and keep it close.

### Don't wait for someone else

We expect you to be proactive about answering questions in your domain, even very early on after you are hired – e.g. after the first week. Look in the code. Read the docs. Find the answer.

Being wrong is way better than being silent – if you are wrong, someone will correct you. If you are silent, you're not doing your job.

Similarly, if you need something to get done, you are responsible for making _sure_ it gets done. This is not your team lead's job or some other team's job - if you need it, you own it. _Most_ of the time this means doing it yourself (see section on helping yourself above); other times it means getting the right people together to understand the urgency and do it with you. But at the end of the day, the responsibility rests on you.

### Have an opinion

You definitely don't need to have opinions on everything, but you should absolutely have opinions on your area of expertise.

If you don't have opinions on your area, you are realistically then just waiting for someone to tell you what to do, which is very much at odds with our autonomous way of working.

Opinions can take a bit to form, and that's okay – you don't need to have them on day one. But we expect you to start forming them rather early on, even if it's just on little things.

### Look around corners

We expect you to be thinking through not only the one change you're making right now, but also how that change plays out down the road. What might happen with this code / process / thing in 6 months? Where will that leave my change today?

We do have more senior people on the team (both in industry experience and in their tenure at PostHog), but they shouldn't be the only ones looking ahead – you should be the primary one looking ahead for _your_ changes.

### Don't assign issues to people

You can list and categorize issues. If you want someone to see an issue, @mention them and/or Slack them the link.

### Don't yolo merge

Do not "yolo merge" – i.e.: force a change to our website or platform without someone else checking it. This should _only_ happen in emergencies, _even_ for simple changes. It is _so_ frequent that we find issues. If you have _any_ doubt, get someone else to look at it first.

### PRs > issues > Slack

Bias for action. If you can just pick up the work, do so. We want a culture of individual contribution _not_ of delegation.

It is fine (and encouraged) to pick-up side quests, or to deviate from your goals if you think you should. Especially if something is a quick fix, do it yourself as part of our value that _You're the driver_.

If you aren't able to make a change yourself, create an issue in GitHub. Avoid simply relaying to-dos in Slack as a means of getting someone to pick up a task. It's hard to track and easy to forget.

### Do things as publicly as possible by default

For discussions, public repos are the best place. Then private ones, then Slack public channels, then Slack private channels or DMs. This is part of our _"Make it public"_ value, and helps with general context setting for the wider team, which means everyone can work more autonomously.

There are only a few exceptions to what we can't share publicly, for example if you are discussing security concerns, specific customers (for privacy reasons), revenue, or growth numbers (since these cause signalling issues with investors or competitors).

Internally, _everything_ can be shared apart from people issues – such as HR / personal (i.e. recruitment or health data).

### Be proactive with community questions

Don't _only_ help the community when you're the person on support hero in your small team. No matter what your goals may be, if you can quickly ship fixes to real life user problems, then you are going to build goodwill, word-of-mouth growth, and a better product all in one swoop.

You can find these in posthog.com/questions.

### And if you don't work here...

Apply for a job at PostHog!